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1. LIST OF PRESENTATIONS 
1. Machine Protection System(s) - Overview 
R.SCHMIDT 
2. Collimators and Beam Absorbers for Cleaning and 
Machine Protection 
R.ASSMANN 
3. LHC aperture and commissioning of the collimation 
system 
S.REDAELLI 
4. Beam instrumentation other than BLMs linked to 
machine protection  
R. JONES 
5. Commissioning of the protection systems 
J.WENNINGER 
6. Objects Capable of Touching the Beams 
P.COLLIER 
7. Will we ever get the green light for beam operation 
J.UYTHOVEN and R.FILIPPINI 
8. Beam loss induced quench levels 
A.SIEMKO 
9. Damage Levels: Comparison of experiment and 
simulation 
V.KAIN 
2. QUESTIONS BEING ADDRESSED 
1. Why so much talking about machine protection? 
2. When is the LHC safe ? 
3. When could the LHC be unsafe ? 
4. Why could the LHC be unsafe ? 
• failures in the magnet and powering system 
• failures of movable devices touching the beam 
• other failures 
5. What protection systems will be there ? 
6. What is the role of collimators for beam cleaning and 
machine protection ? 
7. What is the role of beam instruments for machine 
protection ? 
8. How to commission the protection systems ? 
9. How to operate in presence of the protection 
systems ? 
3. WHAT IS SAFE ? 
The damage level for fast proton losses at 450 GeV has 
been estimated to 1-2•1012 and at 7 TeV to about 1-2•1010. 
Only below these levels beam induced damage in case of 
failures can be excluded, and LHC beam operation would 
not require any special protection. At 7 TeV this is four 
orders of magnitude below the nominal beam current. 
When beam losses exceed the quench level, operation 
relies on efficient cleaning to capture particles in two 
insertions with normal conducting magnets. In case of a 
quench the beams must be dumped and some hours of 
beam time are lost. 
When beam losses are above damage level (several 
orders above quench level), preventing equipment 
damage requires the machine protection systems to work 
correctly.   
The simulated beam induced damage levels were 
compared with the results from an experiment where the 
SPS 450 GeV beam was extracted on a target. The good 
agreement between FLUKA simulations and experimental 
results suggest that calculations of the damage level for 
the most likely failure scenarios at 7 TeV would be very 
useful, to establish a better knowledge of the damage 
risks at top energy.  
When operating with 43 bunches, damage at injection 
is highly unlikely, since the bunches are injected during 
several SPS cycles. Only a limited number of failure 
modes could lead to beam losses damaging equipment at 
higher energy.  
An energy of ~mJoule/cm3 is sufficient to quench a 
magnet at 7 TeV. The nominal beam with 3·1014 protons 
has an energy of 360 MJoule and 3·106 protons have an 
energy of 3.6 Joule. In case of particle losses only a 
fraction of the energy will be deposited in the magnet 
coil. The quench level for a fast loss is 106-107 protons. 
Quench levels vary for different magnet types. The 
duration of the loss must be taken into account (see Table 
1) [1, 2]. 
 
Quench margins for short transient losses (Helium cooling 
ignored) at 7TeV
MQM in matching sections: 5 mJ/cm3
MQM in dispersion suppressors: 1 mJ/cm3
MQXA: 2 mJ/cm3
MQXB: 0.4 mJ/cm3
6 MQTL (in IR3 and IR7): 1.0 mJ/cm3
MB (no helium):  1.6 mJ/cm3 
Quench margins for long transient losses (Helium enthalpy 
included)  
MB (with helium):  20 mJ/cm3 
Quench margins for continuous losses
Cooling capacity for continuous beam losses order of 1 W/m
Table 1: Quench levels for different type of magnets 
4. OBJECTS CLOSE TO THE BEAM 
In total, about 500 objects can move into the beam, the 
majority being vacuum valves. Most valves are slowly 
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moving and interlocking is straightforward. However, it is 
proposed to install two fast valves between LHCb and the 
triplet magnets that could close within 13 ms, for limiting 
the consequences of a vacuum leak. The risk of installing 
these valves should be compared with the risk of not 
installing them. If they are installed, redundant and safe 
interlocking is required. 
There are many collimators for beam cleaning and 
machine protection. Two experiments, LHCb and 
TOTEM can move their detectors inside the beam pipe. 
Beam instruments such as screens, wire scanners and 
mirrors can touch the beam. A few stoppers for radiation 
emitted by the RF system and for the access safety system 
will also be installed.  
The position of some objects with respect to the beam 
depends on the machine mode. As an example, the 
detectors may only move towards the beam at top energy 
when there is stable beams for physics. At injection, the 
detectors must be in fully out position. For efficient 
protection, the machine mode needs to be taken into 
account. 
The layout of a highly sophisticated beam cleaning 
system layout has been finalised. No more than 1 out of 
10000 impacting protons may escape the cleaning system. 
There are 138 locations with different types of 
collimators: 
• Collimators to capture particles in the beam cleaning 
insertions, to avoid quenches and to define the 
mechanical aperture for the circulating beam. 
• Beam diluters to prevent damage for a full wrongly 
injected beam and for ~1% of wrongly extracted 
beam: behind the diluters the energy density is below 
damage level. 
• Movable absorbers to improve cleaning and to stop 
debris from interactions. 
• Few scrapers to define the beam distribution. 
Prototype collimators have been tested at the SPS. The 
robustness has been demonstrated. A collimator jaw can 
stand the full SPS beam without showing any sign of 
damage. For the alignment of the jaws with respect to the 
circulating beam a position accuracy of 50 µm and an 
angle accuracy in the order of 20 µrad was achieved.  
A baseline control architecture has been proposed. One 
central application should control all objects. Controls for 
collimators is complex, both hardware and software must 
be defined and developed. This requires urgent follow-up.  
For early LHC operation a single stage cleaning is 
proposed, which is expected to be reasonably simple. 
Concerning machine protection: studies show that there 
is a decent phase coverage. Beam will likely to be 
intercepted first at collimators, also for fast orbit changes.  
 The efficiency of cleaning during the energy ramp is 
expected to improve if the collimators are closed. The 
absolute distance between primary and secondary 
collimators would remain unchanged. Closing the gap 
helps to define the aperture and ensures that the beam will 
hit collimators first in case of failure. 
For beam cleaning studies, the LHC aperture is now 
modeled in detail (10 cm resolution). A small loss of 
aperture would decrease cleaning efficiency and must 
therefore be avoided. 
The evolution of beta beating and orbit during 
injection, ramp and squeeze is critical, and work is 
required. The responsibilities for these studies need to be 
better defined.   
Tools for tracking particles through the LHC were 
developed. Loss maps for protons around the accelerator 
have been worked out, for a machine without and with 
(some) imperfections. This allows to calculate the 
detailed longitudinal and transverse loss distribution: 
which element is hit, and where is it hit. 
For a lifetime of the beam of 0.2 hours, the “Local 
cleaning inefficiency” exceeds the presumed quench level 
by more than one order of magnitude. Not yet all 
collimators were included in the tracking. The 
assumptions for the quench level are based on 
calculations for dipole magnets that was done about 10 
years ago. It is not realistic that only dipoles are hit, other 
magnets will also be exposed.  
 Calculating the quench levels from local cleaning 
inefficiency is not straightforward, an improved approach 
in close collaboration with magnet and cryogenics experts 
is suggested. A workshop will be organised on 3-4 March 
2005 to discuss the issue. 
5. PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
Beam dump requests can come from several systems: 
• Hardware diagnostics  
• Quench Protection System   
• Fast magnet current change monitors. During this 
workshop it became clear that such monitors are 
required.   
• Beam loss monitors (BLMs) at the collimators and 
other aperture limitations   
• Beam loss monitors in the arcs 
• Beam position (change) monitors 
• Fast beam current decay (“lifetime”) monitors  
 
The role of the beam instruments for protection was 
presented (the BLMs were discussed in other sessions). 
For the beam position interlock in the beam dumping 
insertion a solution exists using modified LHC orbit 
system electronics. This will protect the dump line from 
damage for all scenarios and limit quenches of the Q4 
quadrupole for extraction failure modes. 
Interlock for fast beam position changes and 
oscillations: at injection, protection is provided by the 
4 mm interlock for the beam dump. Protection is also 
possible at 7 TeV if  an interlock is implemented 
requesting a beam dump for fast orbit movements 
exceeding 1 mm. 
Capabilities of Fast Beam Current Transformers for 
machine protection when operating with circulating 
beam: Beam current decay monitoring with fast BCTs 
seems capable of detecting a loss of 1011 protons in 1 ms. 
Such monitor provides redundancy to the complex BLM 
system. It will fully protect the LHC at 450 GeV and for 
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most cases at 7 TeV, provided that the beam is correctly 
dumped after the drop in beam current has been detected. 
Other instruments used for machine protection are the 
BCTs for generation of the safe beam flag, probably with 
a DCCT as this also measures unbunched beam. 
A longitudinal density monitor will detect beam in 
abort gap and is currently under development. 
Safety and availability requirements need to be 
addressed and will force these systems to be as simple 
and robust as possible. 
10. COMMISSIONING AND OPERATION 
The machine protection systems are very complex and 
require careful commissioning. This will already start 
long before first beam operation: 
 
• The SPS extraction interlocks should be operational 
• The LHC powering interlocks should be operational 
• The LHC beam interlock should be partly operational 
 
Pre-defined checklists and procedures for interlock 
testing must be established and agreed on in advance. 
Dedicated time slots must be devoted to interlock tests. 
Tests must be documented. Such procedures will be tested 
from 2006 onwards at the SPS and for LHC hardware 
commissioning. 
 
Safety and reliability of the machine protection during 
operation was discussed. There are four scenarios for 
ending a fill: 
1. The fill ends with a beam dump request by an 
operator, for example, because the luminosity is too 
low. The beam is dumped correctly. 
2. For an equipment or operational failure likely to 
cause beam losses, the machine protection system 
detects the failure and issues a beam dump request. 
The beam is dumped correctly (downtime due to 
“non Machine Protection” systems).  
3. One element in the machine protection system has a 
fault: Since the system is redundant and failsafe, it 
issues a beam dump request. The beam is dumped 
correctly (downtime due to Machine Protection 
systems). 
4. Any dump request that is either not executed or badly 
executed (“unsafe”): the machine protection system 
DOES NOT work correctly. The beam is lost in an 
uncontrolled way. Such failure is not permitted. 
An analysis of the probability for these scenarios was 
performed, and preliminary results are given in Table 2. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
The awareness that machine protection is critical and an 
integral part of LHC operation is now high. 
With 43 / 43 nominal bunches luminosity exceeding                    
L = 1032 cm-2s-1 reasonably safe operation is expected. 
Damage at injection is hardly possible, only a few failure 
modes could lead to damage at top energy. Quenches are 
still likely and this period is a good opportunity to 
learn about the LHC and to gain confidence in the 
protection systems. 
Since the requirements for cleaning efficiency is 
extreme, beam induced quenches could be the most 
important performance limit for LHC. Assessing the loss 
pattern with simulation programs and better 
understanding of beam generated heat deposition and 
quench levels should have high priority.  
The available aperture depends on beta beating and 
closed orbit. Whereas for the closed orbit prototyping of 
real time feedback at the SPS gave promising results, 
studies on beta beating are missing. Questions to be 
addressed are how much beating is expected (possibly 
using data from magnetic measurements), how to measure 
and correct it. Options for the squeeze, for example 
partial squeezing during the ramp should be explored. 
Controls and software for machine protection is another 
issue that deserves attention. Most urgent is the controls 
for collimators and other objects touching the beams - 
to be addressed with priority. Other ideas to be 
explored is an injection sequencer and setting 
management for protection. Software that is safety critical 
should be identified and procedures for accepting this 
software should be addressed. 
Interfaces to experiments should be defined, both for 
experimental magnets and for detectors that could touch 
the beam (to be discussed in the working groups MPWG 
and LEADE). 
 
Table 2: End of fill: Probability for four scenarios for 
TEVATRON based on 300 fills [3], and as anticipated for 
LHC 
 
Although the stored energy in an ion beam is much less 
than for protons, the beam has still damaging power. 
Machine protection for ion operation should be 
addressed (to be discussed in MPWG). 
A magnet current decay monitor is required but 
who has the responsibility?  
Not only BLMs, but also other beam instruments will 
play an important role for protection. The developments 
1 in 300 years
(pessimistic 
assumptions?)
One (ore two?) 





~7% (5% with 
redundant QPS 
powering)
Between 5% and 
10%
Fills end due to 
failure of MPS 
with correct 
beam dump
there are no detailed 
studies of failures by 




Fills end due to 
failure – MPS 
protects machine 







Part of Run 2 
(incl. 300 fills)
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for beam instrumentation for protection are very 
encouraging and should be followed up. 
Studies on safety and availability start to provide the 
probability for failures in the machine protection systems. 
The studies need to become more realistic and should be 
extended. To claim that “My system is very reliable” is 
not sufficient, numbers for safety and availability 
should complement “feeling”. 
For start of beam commissioning, most protection 
systems are required and can be tested before. Clear 
procedures must be followed that need to be 
documented. 
The aperture is now well defined. Beam dynamics with 
transient failures can be addressed. Monte Carlo 
simulations with all machine imperfections should be 
done to find out if there are any holes in the strategy 
for machine protection. 
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